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What the Indian Air Force’s Fleet and Flying Costs Reveal About Strategic Trade-offs

  • Writer: Aman Singh
    Aman Singh
  • Jan 14
  • 3 min read

Updated: Jan 14

IAF Tejas rolling on the runway post landing.

Air power is often discussed in terms of aircraft capability and headline procurement numbers. What is discussed far less, is how force structure and operating costs shape what an air force can realistically sustain. Looking at the Indian Air Force through both lenses together reveals a more grounded picture of capability, constraint and strategic choice.


The Indian Air Force today is not a monolithic fighter force. It is a layered system built around different squadron types, each serving a distinct role. Fighter squadrons form the backbone of combat capability, but they exist alongside transport, helicopter and training squadrons that enable reach, readiness and continuity. This mix reflects operational reality. Air superiority alone is insufficient without the ability to move personnel and equipment, sustain forward deployments and continuously train pilots. That structural balance becomes clearer when the composition of squadrons is viewed as a whole.



For the IAF, Helicopter Squadrons occupy the largest share but Fighter and Transport units together account for a substantial portion of the force. Training squadrons, though smaller in number, are critical to maintaining long-term operational depth. The force, taken together, is designed not just to fight, but to endure.

*Click to expand and ineract


Where the picture becomes more constrained, is in the cost of keeping fighters airborne. Operating cost per flight hour is a quiet but powerful determinant of readiness. It encapsulates fuel consumption, maintenance cycles, spare parts, manpower, training overheads and long-term sustainment. Over decades, these recurring costs often outweigh the price paid to acquire the aircraft in the first place.

---- single engine ---- dual engine


For the IAF’s fighter fleet, these costs vary dramatically. The Su-30MKI, the force’s primary heavyweight fighter, sits at the high end of the spectrum, reflecting its size, complexity and support requirements. The Rafale occupies a middle ground, offering advanced capability at a lower but still significant operating cost. Indigenous platforms such as the HAL Tejas operate at a fraction of these costs, while older fighters like the MiG-21 (now decommissioned), Mirage 2000 and MiG-29 remain comparatively economical to fly.

These figures apply only to fixed-wing fighter aircraft. Rotary wing platforms, despite forming a large part of the overall force, follow entirely different cost structures and are not included in this comparison.

Chart showing flying costs at 60mins for different IAF aircrafts.

Rather than viewing these numbers as static hourly rates, it is more revealing to consider how cost accumulates across a single sortie. Over the span of an hour, the gap between platforms becomes unmistakable. High-capability aircraft accrue expense rapidly, while lighter platforms rise at a far gentler pace. This difference has direct implications for training frequency, pilot proficiency, and force readiness.


One of the more counterintuitive insights emerges when comparing the Tejas and the MiG-29. Despite the Tejas being a single-engine aircraft and the MiG-29 relying on two engines, their operating costs are relatively close. This challenges the assumption that engine count alone determines expense. Design maturity, maintenance philosophy, logistics chains, and the degree of domestic support all play a decisive role in shaping real-world operating cost.



When fleet composition and operating cost are read together, a broader strategic tension comes into focus. Fighter squadrons dominate the operational structure, but their effectiveness depends on how often they can fly. Fuel alone can account for roughly 20 to 30% of per-hour operating costs, meaning that higher sortie rates on expensive platforms quickly strain budgets. Lower-cost aircraft, by contrast, enable more frequent flying within the same financial limits.


As the IAF looks to expand from roughly 30 fighter squadrons toward a long-term goal of 42, this balance becomes increasingly important. Capability without sustainability risks hollowing out readiness. Sustainability without capability limits strategic options. The answer lies not in choosing one over the other, but in managing the mix.


Viewed this way, the Indian Air Force’s fleet is not just a collection of aircraft, but a set of trade-offs made visible through structure, scale, and cost. Understanding those trade-offs offers a more honest view of air power, grounded not just in performance, but in what can be flown, trained on, and sustained year after year. Flying costs and trade-offs.


Data Sources and References

The data and analysis presented in this article are based on publicly available sources:


  1. SSB Crack, “How Much Does It Really Cost to Fly an IAF Fighter Jet for One Hour”

    https://shop.ssbcrack.com/blogs/blog/how-much-does-it-really-cost-to-fly-an-iaf-fighter-jet-for-one-hour


  2. Wikipedia, “Indian Air Force”

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Air_Force


  3. Wikipedia, “List of Active Indian Military Aircraft”

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_active_Indian_military_aircraft


All images used in the visualizations or elsewhere are referenced from publicly available resources.

 
 
 

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